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Asymmetric Price Transmission and Demand Characteristics 
 
Asymmetries in the price transmission from farm markets to wholesale markets, and then to 
retail markets are detrimental to farmers and consumers interest. Numerous studies have 
investigated the reasons for this market phenomenon and provide various explanations. A recent 
survey by Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel (2004) cites 84 studies on asymmetric price 
transmission. A partial list of recent studies include Frigon, Doyon, and Romain (1999), Chavas 
and Mehta (2004), and Carman and Sexton (2005) on dairy products, Richards and Patterson 
(2003) on fresh fruits, Pick, Karrenbrock, and Carman (1990) on citrus, Zhang, Flectcher, and 
Carley (1995) on peanuts, and Miller and Hayenga (2001) on pork. Most empirical studies find 
that farm price increases are transmitted more fully and/or quickly to retail than farm price 
decreases. However, there is no consensus on the explanations for asymmetries in farm-retail 
price transmission. This paper provides a new explanation for asymmetries in the speed of price 
transmission through the effect of a demand characteristic, consumption inertia.   
 
The Model Structure 
Food retailers usually enjoy some market power in retail markets because of differentiation 
among retailers in terms of store locations and other store characteristics, and high concentration 
in many local retail markets. We consider a model where a retailer is able to set the retail price of 
an agricultural product as a monopolist in a local retail market due to high differentiation and 
concentration to facilitate exposition. In the retail market, the demand without consumption 
inertia, which we call as “regular demand”, for the agricultural product offered by this retailer is 
specified as 3 
 
(1)  () Qf Pa b P == − , where  0 a >  and  0 b > .
1  
This retailer procures the agricultural product from a competitive wholesale market, i.e. the 
retailer takes the wholesale price W as given. In addition, the retailer incurs a constant average 
and marginal selling cost, C, per unit of the product. Without losing further generality, we set 
0 C =  to facilitate exposition.  
We analyze how the retail price changes in response to equal increments and decrements in 
the wholesale price to study the price transmission from wholesale to retail. Suppose the 
wholesale price has been stable at the beginning level W0 for a relatively long time. The 
corresponding equilibrium retail prices, quantities, and the retailers’ profit with  0 WW =  in one 
period are  ( ) 00 2 P ab W b =+ ,  ( ) 00 2 Qa b W =− , and  ()
2
00 4 π ab W b =−  respectively. 
Now there is a wholesale price change (either an increase or a decrease). Let’s denote the 
time of this wholesale price change as period 1. The wholesale price either increases to 
10 WW w
+ =+  or decrease to  10 WW w
− =− , where  ( ) 0 0, wW ∈ , subscript “ 1,2,... t = ” to denote 
the t
th period since the wholesale price change, and superscripts “+” and “–” to indicate a 
wholesale price increase and decrease, respectively. This wholesale price change in period 1 can 
be either a temporary change with a possibility  ( ) 0,1 θ ∈  or a permanent one with a possibility 
1 θ − . If it is a temporary change, the wholesale price will return to the pre-change level in period 
2 and stay at that level in all subsequent periods, i.e.  0 tt WWW
+− = =  with  2 t ≥ . On the other 
hand, if the change is permanent, the wholesale price in all subsequent periods will include this 
change, i.e.  1 t WW
++ =  or  1 t WW
−− =  with  2 t ≥ .  
                                                 
1 A linear specification of the demand function allows a focus on the effects of consumption inertia on price 
transmission. With a concave or convex demand function we would have to deal jointly with the effects of demand 
curvature, which has been studied by Azzam (1999) and Fousekis (2008), and the special effects of consumption 
inertia we wish to discuss in this paper.  4 
 
The retailer chooses an optimal pricing strategy for period 1 and the subsequent periods to 
maximize the present value of her total profit. The retailer has three types of pricing strategies: 
(i) a “no-change” strategy, which is to keep her retail price unchanged at  0 P  for all periods in 
spite of the wholesale price change in period 1; (ii) a “waiting” strategy, which is to keep her 
retail price unchanged at  0 P  in period 1, and then change the price in the subsequent periods if 
the wholesale price change is permanent or still charge  0 P  if the wholesale price change is 
temporary; and (iii) an “immediate-change” strategy, which is to change her retail price 
immediately in period 1 and make further price changes if necessary in the subsequent periods. 
Subscripts “i”, “ii”, and “iii” are used to represent these three types of pricing strategies, 
respectively. The retailer incurs a repricing cost  0 S>  for her price changes. The repricing cost 
is symmetric for the direction of price changes, i.e. the repricing cost of raising prices is equal to 
that of reducing prices so that the repricing cost itself will not lead to asymmetric price 
transmission. 
 
The Market without Consumption Inertia 
To provide a benchmark to evaluate the effects of consumption inertia on price transmission, we 
first study the case when consumption inertia does not exist. In this benchmark case, both 
consumer demand when there is a retail price change and consumer demand when the price is 
unchanged, compared to the price in the previous period, are represented by the same function in 
equation (1). Let’s study how retail prices respond to wholesale price changes in this market. If 
the wholesale price increases to  1 W
+  in period 1, by adopting the “no change” strategy, i.e. 
keeping the retail price at  0 P  in all periods, the retailer obtain the profit  u π




00 42 u π ab W b ab Ww
+ =− −−  and subscript “u” indicates that the retail price is unchanged 
at  0 P  in the period. For periods  2 t ≥ , this strategy will yield a per period profit  0 π  if the 
wholesale price change is temporary, and a per period profit  u π
+  if the wholesale price change is 
permanent. Thus, the present value of the retailer’s total profit of choosing the “no change” 
strategy is 
()







Ππ π e π e
γγ θθ
∞∞
++ − − + − −
==
++ − ∑∑ , 
where  0 γ >  is the interest rate.   
Similarly, adopting the “waiting” strategy yields  u π
+  in period 1 and a per period profit  0 π  for 
periods  2 t ≥  if the wholesale price change is temporary. However, if the wholesale price change 
is permanent, the retailer will increase her price and incur a repricing cost S in period 2 to receive 
a per period profit  op π
+  for periods  2 t ≥ , where  ()
2
0 4 op π ab W b w b
+ =− −   is the optimal profit 
under the regular consumer demand in (1) when the wholesale price increases to  1 W
+ and 
subscript “op” denotes optimal. In total, the “waiting” strategy can let the retailer obtain the total 
profits with a present value  
()







Ππ π e π eS e
γ γγ θθ
∞∞
++ − − + − − −
==
⎡⎤
=+ + − − ⎢⎥
⎣⎦ ∑∑ . 
If the retailer adopts the third strategy, the “immediate change” strategy, she will raise the 
retail price to  () 0 op P a bW bw 2b
+ =+ + , receive  op π
+ , and incur a repricing cost S in period 1, 
reduce the price back to  0 P  in period 2 and receive a per period profit  0 π  for periods  2 t ≥  if the 
wholesale price change is temporary, and keep the price at  op P
+  and receive a per period profit 6 
 
op π
+  for periods  2 t ≥  if the wholesale price change is permanent. The present value of total profit 
of adopting the “immediate change” strategy is 
()







ΠπS π e+ π e
γγ θθ
∞∞
++ − − + − −
==
−− ∑∑ . 
We compare the present values of total profits of the three pricing strategies to find the 
retailer’s choice. When the wholesale price increases by w, the retailer will choose  
(2)   
(
(
the "no change" strategy if 0, ,
the "waiting" strategy if , , and

















where  () 21 i eS b
γ ϕ
+− =−  and  ( ) 21 ii ee S b
γγ ϕθ
+− − =− + .   
On the other hand, if the wholesale price decreases to  1 W
− , we also calculate and compare the 
present values of total profits of the three pricing strategies. When the wholesale price decreases 
by w, the retailer will choose  
(3)   
(
(
the "no change" strategy if 0, ,
the "waiting" strategy if , , and

















where  () 21 ii eS b
γ ϕϕ
−−+ =− =  and  ( ) 21 ii ii ee S b
γγ ϕ θ ϕ
− −− + = −+ =. The results of  ii ϕ ϕ
− + = , 
ii ii ϕ ϕ
−+ = , show that the retail price’s response does not depend on the direction of a wholesale 
price change. For any equivalent increments and decrements in the wholesale price, the retail 
price’s responses in terms of whether it will change and, if change, how quickly the retailer price 
will change are the same. Thus, the wholesale-retail price transmission is symmetric when there 
is no consumption inertia in this model. 7 
 
The Consumption Inertia Model 
Now consider the case when consumption inertia exists. In a short time (one period in this 
model) after a retail price change, consumer demand may exhibit the phenomenon of 
consumption inertia, which means consumers are reluctant to deviate too much from their 
previous consumption levels in spite of the retail price change. The demand with consumption 
inertia for the agricultural product is specified as  








1i f 0 ,
if ,
1i f .
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tt t tt
tt t t t
Qk a k Q k b P Q Q
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⎪ =∈ + ⎨
⎪ =+ + > + ⎩
  
The demand with consumption inertia was illustrated in figure 1. Equation (4) and figure 1 show 
that if the retail price change is large enough to cause the new consumption level to deviate more 
than δ  units from the consumption experience of the previous period, consumers are only 
willing to reduce (raise) their consumption level beyond this experience range, which we defined 
as [ ] 11 , tt QQ −δ δ −− + , by a smaller amount for one-unit additional retail price increase (decrease) 
than in the case of regular demand. Thus, a consumption inertia effect is triggered if a retail price 
change causes a new consumption level to deviates more than δ  units from the previous level. 
To focus on the case that a consumption inertia effect can be triggered by retail price changes in 
response to a wholesale price change, two conditions,  2 bw δ <  and () ()
22 221 aak δδ − +< < , 
are assumed to hold.  
We investigate how the retail price responds to wholesale price changes in this market with 
consumption inertia. If the wholesale price increases to  10 WW w
+ = +  in period 1, adopting the 
“no change” pricing strategy will not trigger the consumption inertia effect in demand because 8 
 
the retail price remains unchanged in all periods. Thus, the present value  i Ω
+ of total profit of 
this strategy is that same as that  i Π
+ for the benchmark case. 
With the “waiting” strategy, the retailer receives  u π
+  in period 1 and a per period profit  0 π  for 
periods  2 t ≥  if the wholesale price change is temporary.  However, if the wholesale price 
change is permanent, the retailer will incur a repricing cost to raise her price in period 2 and this 
price change triggers a consumption inertia effect in period 2. Using the demand function in (4), 
we obtain the equilibrium in the market with a consumption inertia effect in period 2 as follows, 
( ) ( )( ) 00 21 2 4 ci Q k ab W b w kab W δ
+ =−− + − −− , 
( ) ( )( ) 00 21 24 ci P a bW bw b k a bW bk δ
+ =+ + + − − − , 
and  () () ( )
2
00 21 24 ci π bk a bW bw b k a bW bk δ
+ =− − + − − − ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ , 
where the subscript “ci ” denotes consumption inertia. In the next period (period 3), consumers 
are able to make all necessary adjustments so that the consumption inertia effect disappears. 
Thus, the retailer will set her price to  op P
+  in period 3 and keep this price level for all subsequent 
periods. The retailer receives a per period profit  op π
+  for periods  3 t ≥ . The present value of total 
profit of the “waiting” strategy is 
()





ii u ci op
tt
Ωπ π e π e π eS e
γ γγ γ θθ
∞∞
++ − − + − + − − −
==
⎡⎤
=+ + − + − ⎢⎥
⎣⎦ ∑∑  . 
If the retailer adopts the “immediate change” strategy, she incurs a repricing cost S to raise 
her price in period 1 and this change triggers a consumption inertia effect. The retailer receives 
ci π
+  in period 1. Again, the consumption inertia effect disappears in the next period (period 2). 
Thus, the retailer reduces her price back to  0 P  and receive a per period profit  0 π  for periods 9 
 
2 t ≥  if the wholesale price change is temporary, or sets the price at 
+
op P  and receive a per period 
profit 
+
op π  for periods  2 t ≥  if the wholesale price change is permanent. The present value of total 
profit of the “immediate change” strategy is 
()







ΩπS π e π e
γγ θθ
∞∞
++ − − + − −
==
=− + + − ∑∑ . 
We compare the present values of total profits generated by the three pricing strategies to 
analyze the optimal choice of the retailer. When consumption inertia exists, if the wholesale 
price increase by the magnitude of w, the retailer will choose 
(5)   
(
(
the "no change" strategy if 0, ,
the "waiting" strategy if , , and
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+− = ,  ()
1 0 ii ii G η
+− = , and  ( )
1 • i G
−  and  ( )
1 • ii G
−  are the inverse function of  
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and  () () () ( )
2 41 1 ii i Gw Gw eb w e e e
γ γγ γ θθ
−− − − =− −− + , respectively. 
On the other hand, when a wholesale price decrease by the magnitude of w to  1 W
− , the 
retailer also has the three pricing strategies. We derive and compare the present values of three 




the "no change" strategy if 0, ,
the "waiting" strategy if , , and













⎧ ⎤ ∈ ⎦ ⎪ ⎪ ⎤ ∈ ⎨ ⎦
⎪
> ⎪ ⎩
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where  ii η η
−+ >  and  ii ii η η
−+ > . The results,  ii η η
− + >  and  ii ii η η
− + > , show that, when consumption 
inertia exists, the wholesale-retail price transmission is asymmetric for some levels of wholesale 
price changes. If the magnitudes of wholesale price changes belong to ( ) , ii ii η η
+ − , the retail price 
will increase immediately in response to a wholesale price increase, while, for an equivalent 
wholesale price decrease, the retail price will either remain unchanged all the time or wait for 
some time before any reduction. If the magnitudes of wholesale price changes belong to 
() , ii η η
+− , for a wholesale price increase, the retail price will increase either immediately or after 
some time, but the retail price will always remain unchanged in response to an equivalent 
wholesale price decrease. These asymmetries in wholesale-retail price transmission can only be 
attributed to consumption inertia based on the comparison of the analysis of this market with 
consumption inertia and that of the benchmark case. Proposition 1 summarizes the results. 
  
PROPOSITION 1. Consumption inertia can cause asymmetries in the price transmission from 
wholesale to retail markets when seller power exists in retail markets. For some medium levels 
of wholesale price changes  () ( ) ,, ii i i i i w ηη ηη
+− +− ⎡⎤ ∈ ⎣⎦ ∪ , consumption inertia causes the following 
asymmetries:  
(i)  Retail prices rise immediately in response to a wholesale price increase while their 
response to an equivalent wholesale price decrease is slower, or 
(ii) retail prices rise in response to a wholesale price increase while retail prices remain 
unchanged in response to an equivalent wholesale price decrease.  
 11 
 
The range of wholesale price changes that are asymmetrically transmitted to retail is affected 
by the magnitude of consumption inertia in demand. The result on this relationship is included in 
the following proposition.   
 
PROPOSITION 2. A stronger consumption inertia effect, represented by a smaller δ  and/or k , 
leads to a wider range, () () ,, ii i i i i η ηη η
+− +− ∪ , of wholesale price changes that are asymmetrically 
transmitted to retail markets.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper uses a simple framework to study asymmetries in the speed of price transmission 
from farm to retail markets. This paper finds that consumption inertia during price changes can 
cause retail prices to rise more quickly in response to a wholesale price increase than their 
response to an equivalent wholesale price decrease. Consumption inertia may also cause retail 
prices remain unchanged in response to an equivalent wholesale price decrease. A stronger 
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